From ‘Land of Smiles’ to ‘Land of Snarls’ – An Exploration of Thailand’s Descent into Hatred and Intolerance

By Yvan Cohen

A lot has been written about the various political dimensions of Thailand’s deepening crisis. But what about it’s emotional and psychological roots? How has this so called ‘Land of Smiles’ become so riven by hatred? How has a nation predominantly populated by Buddhists, for whom compromise and tolerance is a central part of their credo, become so intolerant and polarised?

I see a number of key factors fueling the current climate of unrest - namely a growing sense of injustice (on both sides), deep rooted frustration caused by unequal opportunities, intense disappointment in politicians and the political system and, more broadly, the destabilising effects of a society that has lost its traditional anchors and finds itself off balance while searching for a new status quo.

These factors offer entry points for an exploration of what might be seen as the emotional and psychological dynamic – now often expressed violently and irrationally – behind the ongoing crisis.

The language of hatred that has flourished (on both sides) in the period of polarisation leading up to the current crisis has been particularly disturbing for its intensity and for its tendency to dehumanise the opposition.

This is a psychological strategy typically deployed prior to conflict. It is easier to maim and kill another human when you have internalised a belief that your opponent is less human than you. In Rwanda ethnic Hutus referred to rival Tutsis as cockroaches before they massacred them. The Nazi’s spoke of Jews as subhuman vermin. And there are many more examples of such behavior in times of war.

Worryingly, in the political speeches being delivered in Thailand today it is common to hear leaders characterising their opponents as animals or using specific grammatical references (e.g. ‘man’ in Thai) that are normally used when speaking of animals or inanimate objects. Comparisons to Rwanda and Nazi Germany are surely exaggerated in Thailand's case but the risks of conflict and considerable loss of life are nevertheless real.

Hatred has also found fertile ground in the widening space between economic strata and geographic regions. It is easier to hate (or at least not empathise with) people with whom you have little connection.

To appreciate how Thai society has changed it is worth looking at the traditional structure upon which it is based.

Traditionally, Thai society has been defined by its pronounced hierarchical nature – a structure that was most visibly expressed in the ‘sakdina’ system which codified the stratification of society with the monarch at its apex.

Even beyond the end of ‘sakdina’, the reality of Thailand’s social hierarchy persisted, relying for stability on a delicate balance of mutual interest and acceptance. Thus Thais (though this artificial ethnic designation seems barely accurate when referring to earlier historic periods) were willing participants in a hierarchical system that was seen to divide power and material benefit acceptably if not entirely equitably.

The philosophical and theological underpinning for this system were largely drawn from a mixture of Buddhist concepts of Karma and ancient Indian concepts of caste (‘Varna’). One’s status, therefore, was owed not to a nexus of economic and social forces but to merit accumulated in previous lives and to one’s ‘destiny’.

Against a backdrop of intense economic, technological and social change, however, this traditional hierarchical structure, and the philosophy behind it, is being challenged. In today’s Thailand the distance between groups within this hierarchy has grown far wider while acceptance for such inequality has declined. 

Growing economic disparities combined with increasing access to the basic tools of education and communication (high rates of literacy and almost universal access to media throughout the provinces) and a broader understanding of the political empowerment embodied in the democratic system of one man one vote, has made traditional hierarchical values appear increasingly unjust and anachronistic.

Acceptance for the status quo of the traditional social order is crumbling.

As a result, Thailand’s social contract now needs rewriting. Thai society has lost the fragile equilibrium that relied on a degree of acceptance and reasonable mutual benefit. In short, Thai society is now out of balance and key groups in society (both economic and regional) have become increasingly estranged one from the other.

A new social contract will need to encompass a spirit of inclusion that ensures the benefits of economic growth are more evenly shared throughout the country among social, economic and regional groups.

Alongside this loss of social balance, the spiritual pillars that might have anchored Thailand and pulled its people back from the displays of hatred and violence we are witnessing, have also been eroded.

The role of the temple as the core of spiritual life has declined. A series of scandals involving monks has reduced their credibility as moral guides while the practical demands of modern life, and of intense consumerism, have left little time for the cultivation of spiritual and moral values.

Thus Thailand appears morally adrift with no spiritual or religious institution strong enough or respected enough to stand above the current environment of polarisation and preach the tolerant, peaceful ethic of compromise which lie at the heart of Buddhist philosophy.

Indeed, with the extreme Buddhist force known as the Dharma Army playing an active role in anti-government demonstrations, alongside more moderate monks who have also offered their blessings to protest leaders on both sides, it is clear that Thailand’s Buddhist establishment is unlikely to hold the key to peace, at least for the moment.

Alongside the decline of Thailand’s spiritual institutions, the question of the king’s eventual passing – and of the succession to the throne - are placing additional stress on the system. Without the King, a much loved figure in whom ultimate moral and political legitimacy have been invested, there is a sense that the nation will be without guidance and without the ultimate arbiter on whom it has traditionally relied in times of trouble.

It is imperative, therefore, that Thailand evolve from its investment purely in personal power and prestige (exemplified by the popularity of the two political leaders Suthep Thaungsuban and Thaksin Shinawatra) towards a less personality driven, more institution based, system where independent organs of State provide the checks and balances (within the framework of a democratic constitutional monarchy) that will allow a minority to live alongside a majority secure in the knowledge that its rights – and to a certain degree its interests – will be protected. 

Lastly, much has been made of the social dimension of the current crisis with suggestions that we are witnessing something akin to a class war (between the rural poor and the wealthier urban middle class). Or that this is something like a mini French Revolution with the peasants rising up to topple the ‘ancien regime’.

Though tempting, such comparisons are, I believe, misleading.

Though the red shirt movement likes to refer to a struggle between the ‘phrai’ (underclass or ‘serfs’) and the ‘amat’ (the ruling class), and though this characterisation has found traction in the minds of many in the red shirt movement, the roots of Thailand’s polarisation result from a change in society that has seen a much broader group of Thais competing to access the same social and economic space as a smaller, more privileged, generally urban minority. Many rural red shirt supporters are not seeking to overthrow the system but instead are demanding a louder voice within the system and a greater share of the pie.

Thus, while economic the economic gap between the city and the countryside has surely widened, the social and intellectual space inhabited by these disparate economic groups has actually narrowed. Though there is a deficit of opportunity for many rural folk, they increasingly inhabit the same aspirational space as their urban peers.

Among certain anti-government protesters in Bangkok the claim has been made that rural folk are not educated enough to vote. In reality, however, it is their increasing education and their increasing awareness of their democratic rights which is driving rural constituencies to play a more active role in national political life. Paradoxically, therefore, it is their increasing education – not the lack of it – which is feeding current tensions.

This increased proximity of aspirations between rural and urban Thais has intensified a sense of frustration for many rural people who feel they lack opportunities with little chance of climbing the social and economic ladder.

Much has been made of the problem of corruption. Anti-government protesters rightly complain of the excesses and corruption of Thaksin Shinawatra and of his proxy governments. But the current crisis is perhaps much less about resolving problems of corruption (though this is clearly important) and much more about re-establishing a new equilibrium in Thai society, about creating a neutral political space, complete with democratic protections for the minority, where a much broader segment of the population can share in the opportunities created by Thailand’s economic growth

The focus should be on strengthening the foundations and apparatus of an independent democratic state with a bureaucracy and judiciary that functions independently of political interests, while protecting the rights of all of its citizen regardless of political affiliation. The infrastructure is already in place, it just needs nurturing and protecting. 

Sadly, in the current climate of polarisation, mistrust and bitterness it is hard to see how any of the key political players will be able to lead Thailand towards this goal. None possess the broad moral and political legitimacy needed to initiate a process of unification and neutralisation; the only ground upon which the legitimacy of the state can be rebuilt.

Thus Thailand finds itself caught, helplessly it seems, in the historic spasms of a deep social and political transition. One can only hope the transition is not too long, or too violent and that it does not tear Thailand as we know and love it apart.