A lot has been written about the various political
dimensions of Thailand’s deepening crisis. But what
about it’s emotional and psychological roots? How has this so
called ‘Land of Smiles’ become so riven by
hatred? How has a nation predominantly populated by Buddhists, for whom
compromise and tolerance is a central part of their credo, become so intolerant
and polarised?
I see a number of key factors fueling the current climate of unrest - namely a growing sense of injustice (on both sides), deep rooted frustration
caused by unequal opportunities, intense disappointment in politicians and the
political system and, more broadly, the destabilising effects of a society that
has lost its traditional anchors and finds itself off balance while searching
for a new status quo.
These factors offer entry points for an exploration of what
might be seen as the emotional and psychological dynamic – now often
expressed violently and irrationally – behind the ongoing crisis.
The language of hatred that has flourished (on both sides) in the period of
polarisation leading up to the current crisis has been particularly disturbing
for its intensity and for its tendency to dehumanise the opposition.
This is a psychological strategy typically deployed prior to
conflict. It is easier to maim and kill another human when you have
internalised a belief that your opponent is less human than you. In Rwanda ethnic Hutus referred to rival Tutsis as
cockroaches before they massacred them. The Nazi’s spoke of Jews as
subhuman vermin. And there are many more examples of such behavior in times of
war.
Worryingly, in the political speeches being delivered in
Thailand today it is common to hear leaders characterising their opponents as
animals or using specific grammatical references (e.g. ‘man’
in Thai) that are normally used when speaking of animals or inanimate objects. Comparisons to Rwanda and Nazi Germany are surely exaggerated in Thailand's case but the risks of conflict and considerable loss of life are nevertheless real.
Hatred has also found fertile ground in the widening space between
economic strata and geographic regions. It is easier to hate
(or at least not empathise with) people with whom you have little connection.
To appreciate how Thai society has changed it is
worth looking at the traditional structure upon which it is based.
Traditionally, Thai society has been defined by its
pronounced hierarchical nature – a structure that was most visibly expressed in
the ‘sakdina’ system which
codified the stratification of society with the monarch at its apex.
Even beyond the end of ‘sakdina’,
the reality of Thailand’s social hierarchy persisted,
relying for stability on a delicate balance of mutual interest and acceptance. Thus Thais
(though this artificial ethnic designation seems barely accurate when referring
to earlier historic periods) were willing participants in a hierarchical system
that was seen to divide power and material benefit acceptably if not entirely
equitably.
The philosophical and theological underpinning for this
system were largely drawn from a mixture of Buddhist concepts of Karma and
ancient Indian concepts of caste (‘Varna’).
One’s status, therefore, was owed not to a nexus of economic
and social forces but to merit accumulated in previous lives and to one’s
‘destiny’.
Against a backdrop of intense economic, technological and
social change, however, this traditional hierarchical structure, and the
philosophy behind it, is being challenged. In today’s
Thailand the distance between groups within this hierarchy has grown far wider while
acceptance for such inequality has declined.
Growing economic disparities combined with increasing access
to the basic tools of education and communication (high rates of literacy and
almost universal access to media throughout the provinces) and a broader
understanding of the political empowerment embodied in the democratic system of
one man one vote, has made traditional hierarchical values appear increasingly
unjust and anachronistic.
Acceptance for the status quo of the traditional social
order is crumbling.
As a result, Thailand’s social contract now
needs rewriting. Thai society has lost the fragile equilibrium that relied on a
degree of acceptance and reasonable mutual benefit. In short, Thai society is
now out of balance and key groups in society (both economic and regional) have
become increasingly estranged one from the other.
A new social contract will need to encompass a spirit of
inclusion that ensures the benefits of economic growth are more evenly shared
throughout the country among social, economic and regional groups.
Alongside this loss of social balance, the spiritual pillars
that might have anchored Thailand and pulled its people back from the displays
of hatred and violence we are witnessing, have also been eroded.
The role of the temple as the core of spiritual life has
declined. A series of scandals involving monks has reduced their credibility as
moral guides while the practical demands of modern life, and of intense
consumerism, have left little time for the cultivation of spiritual and moral
values.
Thus Thailand appears morally adrift with no spiritual or
religious institution strong enough or respected enough to stand above the
current environment of polarisation and preach the tolerant, peaceful ethic of
compromise which lie at the heart of Buddhist philosophy.
Indeed, with the extreme Buddhist force known as the Dharma
Army playing an active role in anti-government demonstrations, alongside more
moderate monks who have also offered their blessings to protest leaders on both sides, it is
clear that Thailand’s Buddhist establishment is
unlikely to hold the key to peace, at least for the moment.
Alongside the decline of Thailand’s
spiritual institutions, the question of the king’s eventual passing – and
of the succession to the throne - are placing additional stress on the system.
Without the King, a much loved figure in whom ultimate moral and political
legitimacy have been invested, there is a sense that the nation will be without
guidance and without the ultimate arbiter on whom it has traditionally relied
in times of trouble.
It is imperative, therefore, that Thailand evolve from its
investment purely in personal power and prestige (exemplified by the popularity of the two political leaders Suthep Thaungsuban and Thaksin Shinawatra) towards a less personality
driven, more institution based, system where independent organs of State
provide the checks and balances (within the framework of a democratic
constitutional monarchy) that will allow a minority to live alongside a
majority secure in the knowledge that its rights – and to a certain degree its
interests – will be protected.
Lastly, much has been made of the social dimension of the
current crisis with suggestions that we are witnessing something akin to a
class war (between the rural poor and the wealthier urban middle class). Or
that this is something like a mini French Revolution with the peasants rising
up to topple the ‘ancien regime’.
Though tempting, such comparisons are, I believe,
misleading.
Though the red shirt movement likes to refer to a struggle
between the ‘phrai’
(underclass or ‘serfs’)
and the ‘amat’ (the ruling class), and though this
characterisation has found traction in the minds of many in the red shirt
movement, the roots of Thailand’s polarisation result
from a change in society that has seen a much broader group of Thais competing
to access the same social and economic space as a smaller, more privileged, generally urban minority. Many rural red shirt supporters are not seeking to overthrow the system but
instead are demanding a louder voice within the system and a greater share of
the pie.
Thus, while economic the economic gap between the city and the
countryside has surely widened, the social and intellectual space inhabited by
these disparate economic groups has actually narrowed. Though there is a
deficit of opportunity for many rural folk, they increasingly inhabit the same
aspirational space as their urban peers.
Among certain anti-government protesters in Bangkok the
claim has been made that rural folk are not educated enough to vote. In reality,
however, it is their increasing education and their increasing awareness of
their democratic rights which is driving rural constituencies to play a more
active role in national political life. Paradoxically, therefore, it is their
increasing education – not the lack of it – which is feeding current tensions.
This increased proximity of aspirations between rural and
urban Thais has intensified a sense of frustration for many rural people who
feel they lack opportunities with little chance of climbing the social and economic ladder.
Much has been made of the problem of corruption.
Anti-government protesters rightly complain of the excesses and corruption of Thaksin
Shinawatra and of his proxy governments. But the current crisis is perhaps much less
about resolving problems of corruption (though this is clearly important) and
much more about re-establishing a new equilibrium in Thai society, about creating
a neutral political space, complete with democratic protections for the minority, where a much broader segment of the population can share in the
opportunities created by Thailand’s economic growth
The focus should be on strengthening the foundations and apparatus of
an independent democratic state with a bureaucracy and judiciary that functions independently of political interests, while protecting the rights of all of its citizen regardless of political affiliation. The infrastructure is already in place, it just needs nurturing and protecting.
Sadly, in the current climate of polarisation, mistrust and
bitterness it is hard to see how any of the key political players will be able to lead Thailand towards this goal. None possess the broad moral
and political legitimacy needed to initiate a process of unification and neutralisation; the only ground upon which the legitimacy of the state can be rebuilt.
Thus Thailand finds itself caught, helplessly it seems, in the
historic spasms of a deep social and political transition. One can only hope
the transition is not too long, or too violent and that it does not tear
Thailand as we know and love it apart.
