Harnessing the Forces of Change

Political systems are dynamic. They are the sum of an ever-evolving, continually interactive relationship between social, political, cultural and historic forces.

In Thailand, the tensions that recently flared into violence on the streets of Bangkok are the symptoms of a political system experiencing the torque of a wrenching transition.

The genesis of modern Thai politics can be traced to 1932 when a military-civilian coup replaced absolute monarchy with the nominal structures of constitutional democracy.

In the ensuing decades Thailand's democracy has been tested by 17 coup d'etats, breakneck economic growth, a jarring economic meltdown and several violent uprisings.

Yet Thailand has often been held up by Western observers as a model: citing its impressive growth and the durability of its democratic institutions; which have continued to function in the benevolent shadow of the nation's much-revered monarchy.

Meanwhile Thai society has undergone massive change. Strained by the alienation of urban-industrial development, traditional relationships have been transformed. Values and expectations have shifted. One of the hallmarks of Thailand's development has been the huge inequality it spawned - between the urban middle class and the rural population.

These socio-cultural changes and the economic inequality engendered by the boom of the nineties lie at the heart of the nation’s current political malaise.

While power may have nominally passed from palace to parliament in 1932, the legitimacy and prestige of Thailand's traditional centers of power did not, and naturally could not, dissolve overnight.

Indeed, the legitimacy and power of Thailand’s monarch, King Bhumipol Adulyadej , has grown significantly in the six decades of his reign; largely as a result of his active commitment to development and his intervention during times of crisis.

Traditional power has, till now, co-existed with the modern infrastructure of democracy. And this despite obvious contradictions between the Western ethos of democracy, which places theoretic emphasis on the equality of all, and Thailand's traditional power structures which revolve around centralised and hierarchic authority.

The simplest expression of traditional political power in Thailand is the relationship between patron and client. Patrons distribute patronage in exchange for the loyalty, and during elections the votes, of their clients.

In Western democratic terms, patron client relationships are 'corrupt'. They do not abide by the encoded rules of an impartial system. They are, instead, determined by the arbitrary ability of a patron to purchase the loyalty of his 'clients' through the distribution of favours, privilege and largess.

In the context of Thai democracy this ‘corrupt’, or more precisely 'traditional', form of politics can function as long as patronage flows from one unchallenged source and for as long as such patronage is able to satisfy the aspirations and expectations of its recipient 'clients'. Like any successful political system it relies on a degree of stability and acquiescence.

In recent years, however, a number of factors have emerged to challenge the stability of Thailand's 'traditional' democracy.

The first could be described as the growing competition between the traditional bureaucratic, aristocratic and military elite and the emergent power of Thailand's nouveau riche 'business class' who have sought to transform wealth and prestige acquired during the boom of the 1990s into political capital. Telecom tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra, who cast himself in the role of a CEO Prime Minister, is the most obvious example of this phenomenon and the most visible challenger to traditional power.

The tension surrounding this struggle for control of the 'centre' of Thailand's political system has been further heightened by an awareness that the nation's much loved monarch is nearing the end of his reign.

The King has been a vital anchor of continuity and stability for Thailand. Many naturally fear that without his stabilising presence and without the legitimacy he lends to the traditional bases of power, Thailand's democracy could melt into an all-out political conflict with elite interest groups battling for control of the State.

While there is a pervasive sense of unease about a future without King Bhumipol and with conflict already visible among Thailand's elites, the current crisis also comprises a broader social component.

Rather like the businessmen who sought to transform their wealth into political capital, Thailand's rural majority also now seek to convert their numerical weight into political power.

This dynamic is being driven by a change in what ordinary people expect of the State, by a heightened understanding of constitutional and democratic rights and by a sense of disillusionment with successive governments that have paid scant attention to the needs of Thailand’s rural majority.

Through his populism, Thaksin Shinawatra took the first step towards allying the central power of the State with the interests of the rural majority. On the face of it, this looked like a positive democratic development.

The reality, however, was that Thaksin did not represent the advent of a more democratic regime but rather the cementing of an alliance of convenience between a rural majority seeking greater influence over central government and a business elite seeking the means to wrest control from what it has labelled as the traditional ‘bureaucratic polity’.

Thakin used his popular mandate to impose a decidedly illiberal style of democratic rule which aimed to stifle debate, neutralise opposition and consolidate control of the independent institutions designed to provide checks and balances to executive power. These excesses were often overlooked or ignored by a majority who saw Thaksin as their 'champion'. At last a leader who was prepared to share some of the State's wealth with the rural poor.

Today, Thailand's political crisis remains in suspended animation. The currents of conflict continue to churn beneath the surface.

To ensure stability, the political establishment needs to recognise the huge socio-cultural and economic changes that have taken place in recent decades and accommodate them in a corresponding adjustment in the balance of power.

Political change can be wrought through upheaval on the streets or through constructive dialogue between players on both sides of the divide. The imperative now is to recognise that change is inevitable and that it is in the interests of all to ensure that the energy and passion being expressed in the political arena today can be channelled into a process that moves the nation forward peacefully and inclusively into the future.

Frustrations Erupt. Bangkok Burns.

After months of seismic activity, political tensions erupted in Bangkok Sunday with red shirt protesters of the Democratic Alliance Against Dictatorship (DAAD) engaged in running battles with troops.

Public buses were set on fire. Enraged gangs hurled Molotov cocktails at soldiers who responded with teargas and gunfire. Skirmishes were also reported between rival civilian groups in several areas of the Bangkok; evidence of the dangerously deep social and political rifts which are driving the current unrest. Ninety four people were reported injured of which twenty three seriously.

The storm clouds of this conflict have been gathering for months, years even; the culmination of a tussle for political power that could determine the landscape of Thai politics for the foreseeable future.

On one side are unruly protesters who threaten the fabric of public order, on the other soldiers and police acting on behalf of the State to restore calm.

In Thailand today, however, there are no neutral institutions capable of acting on behalf of a benign State.

The entire system has become politicized and polarized. There are no government institutions that are perceived as independent. The troops on the streets of Bangkok are part of the political process and are seen as agents of partisan interest. This politicisation of the State means that the machinery of democracy, with its necessary checks and balances, cannot function.

The violence that has eroded Thailand’s hard won image as a tranquil haven for global travelers is a symptom of deep disunity in the country; a clash of interests between the minority forces of the traditional elite and the aspirations of Thailand’s majority, most of who live in countryside.

In this sense the unrest we are witnessing today is substantially different from other memorable political upheavals of Thailand’s recent past.

In 1992, when a ‘mobile phone mob’ confronted military dictator Suchinda Kraprayoon, the demonstrations were limited to Bangkok and were aimed at maintaining a status quo that protected the economic and political interests of the upper and middle class.

In 1973 and 1976, two other significant moments in modern Thai history, the conflict was between right and left wing forces. But in the 1970s, despite a communist sponsored insurgency in the north and northeast, political engagement and leadership, particularly on the left, was essentially limited to Thailand's educated elite. Thus left-wing protests during this period were led by students and were limited to Bangkok.

The nature of the unrest we are seeing today is different in that it mobilises a much broader group of actors. The divisions are a nationwide phenomenon. Where earlier political conflicts were limited challenges that took place within the arena of middle class and urban society, today’s conflagration has drawn in supporters from throughout the social spectrum from both urban and rural sectors

If this sounds like the setting for a revolution, one must also remember that there is precious little ideology on either side of Thailand's divide. For the leaders on both sides, the struggle is for raw power, for control over the levers of State and the bounty that such control can deliver.

More fundamentally, Thailand is facing a challenge of inclusiveness and equality. Its society and politics have traditionally been based on hierarchy. In recent years, however, the concept of democratic rights and participation, propagated by State sponsored awareness campaigns, have become increasingly rooted in popular thinking, challenging the inherent inequality that a hierarchical society requires.

As Thailand reaped the rewards of economic growth in 1990s, this inequality in society escalated. Yet while the elites have become richer and perhaps by extension more detached from their less fortunate counterparts, the poor have also become more educated and by extension more aware of their rights.

If Thailand is to find a way forward and if it is to find a resolution to the conflicts being played out on the streets of the capital today, it must find a way to include and appease the aspirations of its less fortunate majority.

One option is repression. The forces of the traditional elite, through the State, certainly have the tools to repress. But this would surely be a temporary solution serving only to perpetuate the frustrations of many millions of Thais. Unity through inclusion and reconciliation can be the only way forward. Such unity can only be reached through enlightened leadership which seeks to rise above partisan interests, to reconcile differences and to address with sincerity and honesty the concerns of all parties. Until such leadership emerges the current instability and conflict will continue.

Thailand Teeters on the Edge

Thailand's democracy, creaking and groaning under the weight of popular frustration, gnawed at by the self-interest and greed of its political masters, is again hovering dangerously close to the abyss.

This evening tens of thousands of red shirted protesters throng the streets which surround government house in the capital Bangkok, the official seat of government in this Buddhist Kingdom.

Milling happily. Laughing and shouting. The protesters are euphoric, determined, pumped up with the thrill of their collective power. Whipped up by a parade of fiery speakers, they have the confidence of an unstoppable wave of humanity that will literally sweep the government of Abhisit Vejajiva from power.

Ahead of them lies a path of uncertainty that could well be stained with the blood of Thai pitted against Thai. Perhaps it will involve ordinary Thais battling each other in the streets. Or will it end crushed under the heel of a military boot? In a hail of gunfire? Only one outcome seems all but inevitable: the current government will fall, triggering new elections and more instability.

That Thailand's political process, once held up as a paragon of democratic success in the region, should be reduced to such a pitiful charade is a tragic and, of course, unnecessary reality. It is in large part the product of a narrow elite power struggle that may determine the course of this nation for years, perhaps decades, to come.

Thailand's intense political drama has now come full circle. The yellow shirts, aligned with Thailand's traditional elite, who once occupied these same streets, whose leaders railed against the incumbent leader with the same fury, have been replaced by their red shirted opponents. Only the costumes have changed. The fury, the indignation, the absolute conviction of the reds is a mirror image of their yellow counterparts.

Another emotion shared equally by both sides is that of hatred. It is hard to find a precedent in this 'land of smiles' for the vicious invective that has poured from the microphones of the leaders of the protest movements on both sides of the divide.

It all began innocently enough. Thaksin Shinawatra, the telecoms billionaire who won a landslide in 2001, promised a new kind of politics. He was a symbol of hope in post-crisis Thailand that seemed to embody the can-do savvy and dynamism of the business class who had become the heroes of the economic boom that propelled Thailand into the ranks of the developed world.

While Thaksin's CEO style originally resonated comfortably with the traditional elite, his populist political tactics soon began to rankle. Unlike any politician before him, Thaksin played the demographic card, turning his attention to the political constituency of the countryside who naturally constituted the majority. He had come up with a simple formula for democratic success: offer attractive policies to the rural majority and then deliver.

Thaksin quickly transformed his political capital into raw power. He initiated a war on drugs that saw more than 2,000 alleged suspects gunned down without any due process. He began to muzzle a hitherto relatively free press and began loading the independent institutions designed to balance his power with his own supporters.

Despite these excesses and some fairly convincing evidence of corruption, it was Thaksin's popularity at the ballot box that ultimately triggered his ouster and the current crisis. Thaksin had become a threat to the established order.

Thaksin, like no-one before him, opened the Pandora's box of a democratic Thailand where the majority might actually freely choose their leaders; as opposed to selling their votes in the venal political dance that had hitherto become the embarassing reality of Thailand's electoral process.

Today, Thaksin, who was ousted in by a military coup in September 2006 and is currently living in exile, has become an emblem for the divisions which are tearing this nation. To his red shirted supporters, typically rural folk, Thaksin has become a hero and a martyr; who was sacrificed to protect the interests of a minority elite. To his enemies, the yellows, Thaksin is challenging the very fabric of Thailand's social and political order, threatening to upend a system that has always been unquestioningly controlled from the top down.

The reality, sadly, is that on both sides of Thailand's political boxing ring are leaders whose objectives go no further than victory for their respective clique's interests. On neither side is there a leader who offers to go beyond the deep divisions that are the fruit of Thailand's long-standing social, political and economic inequality.

Without a leader able to rise above partisan interests, to envision and communicate a realistic platform for reform that balances the forces of inequality, Thailand will continue to be buffeted by instability, living under the shadow of a significant break down of civil order.

In the time it has taken to write this short piece, the numbers of red shirted protesters has already swelled by many thousands. Forecasts suggest that more than 100,000 could march tomorrow. It promises to be a long, hot summer in Bangkok.